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CAN A CITIZENS’ COMMISSION HELP 
REPAIR CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT?  
LESSONS FROM LOCAL CHARTER REFORM 
Raphael J. Sonenshein* 
While there is widespread agreement that there is a crisis of 
governance in California, there is little consensus on what institutional 
structure would best facilitate useful reform. Although the idea of a 
constitutional convention captured the imagination of the reform 
community, it failed to generate enough financial and political support 
to be implemented. The citizens’ commission, another model of reform, 
has been largely ignored. Yet hundreds of municipal reforms have 
widely and successfully used the commission model over the past 
century. Some state constitutional reforms outside California have 
successfully used such commissions. Further, the legendary U.S. 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 more closely fits the definition of a 
commission than a convention. The commission model of governmental 
reform is much less exciting than a constitutional convention but for 
that very reason it reduces the initial risk of undertaking such an effort, 
a risk that is likely to prove fatal to reform. The low profile of citizen 
commissions allows a thorough airing of issues and the development of 
the sort of credibility that may give its recommendations surprising 
force. California may look to the structures of Florida and Utah—states 
in which permanent constitutional reform commissions have legal 
standing—as models of how California could steadily and effectively 
work toward a solution in a manner that both reduces the immediate 
political risk to all affected interests and leaves open the chance for 
long-term reform. While California’s attempt at reform by commission 
failed in 1996, there are lessons from that experience that can make 
success more likely.  
 
 * Chair, Division of Politics, Administration, and Justice, California State University, 
Fullerton. Based on a presentation at “Rebooting California: Initiatives, Conventions and 
Government Reform,” Loyola Law School Los Angeles, September 27, 2010. 
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“I don’t get the big deal. In my city, if we had these kinds of 
problems, we’d appoint a charter reform commission made 
up of our most respected citizens. They’d go off and study 
it, and come back with recommendations, and then we’d 
vote on it and fix the problem.” 
  —Anonymous attendee at a book forum on 
California’s constitution, California State 
University, Fullerton, September 16, 2010 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
While there is widespread agreement that California’s 
governance structure is broken,1 there is a woeful lack of agreement 
on practical ways to fix the system. 
Reforming governmental structures, even when there is 
widespread acknowledgement that the status quo does not work, 
presents complicated political and design challenges. Interest groups 
and politicians scan the horizon for changes that may affect them. 
They often feel safer with the existing system, which they have 
learned to navigate, rather than with a new system that might force 
them to learn the ropes all over again. And how can they trust 
whoever has the power to propose and implement reforms? 
Reform is a risk. As appealing as any design for new 
governmental structures may be, reform changes the rules. And 
changing the rules may change who gets power. 2 Reform may also 
jeopardize deeply held beliefs (such as in equal rights and civil 
liberties) that current arrangements guarantee. Reformers, therefore, 
must consider how to get the voters and powerful interest groups to 
 
 1. The belief that California has major structural problems has become widespread since 
budget gridlock became chronic over the last decade. E.g., California: The Ungovernable State, 
ECONOMIST, May 14, 2009. Several citizen organizations emerged to argue for a fundamental 
overhaul, including Repair California and California Forward. See JOE MATHEWS & MARK 
PAUL, CALIFORNIA CRACKUP: HOW REFORM BROKE THE GOLDEN STATE AND HOW WE CAN 
FIX IT (2010) (describing a recent example of a program for structural change); Bruce E. Cain & 
Roger G. Noll, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: MAKING STATE 
GOVERNMENT MORE EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE 1 (Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll eds., 
1995); Vladimir Kogan, Lessons from Recent State Constitutional Conventions, CAL. J. POL. & 
POL’Y, 2010, at 1, 5–6; Editorial, The Big Fix, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 2009, at A34. 
 2. See Gerald Benjamin & Thomas Gais, Constitutional Conventionphobia, 1 HOFSTRA L. 
& POL’Y SYMP. 53, 66 (1996); see, e.g., Amy Bridges & Richard Kronick, Writing the Rules to 
Win the Game: The Middle-Class Regimes of Municipal Reformers, 34 URB. AFF. REV. 691, 693 
(1999). 
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even consider reform. Some reforms, such as term limits,3 are 
popular enough that they can overcome such resistance, but most 
reforms lack that sort of popular support. 4 Reform requires a political 
strategy in the broadest sense—namely a plan to get reform on the 
agenda, to develop credible proposals, and then to get reforms 
implemented. 
A strategy that leads with risk will likely fail. For example, if 
there is too great a perceived danger of an ill-advised reform at the 
outset, powerful interest groups and the voting public will kill it in its 
infancy. Conversely, a strategy that is too modest, one that reduces 
risk so much that the reform proposes no significant improvements, 
is a waste of time.5 The key is to develop a process that properly 
limits the initial risk of undertaking change and then generates the 
credibility and political strength to implement significant, useful 
reforms. 
The mechanism for reform that has garnered the most attention 
in California is the constitutional convention.6 There is no well-
established model for a convention. However, we can rely on past 
experience to highlight a convention’s distinctive features. 7 First, a 
convention has roots in popular representation.8 The delegates are so 
 
 3. Elisabeth R. Gerber, Reforming the California Initiative Process, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: MAKING STATE GOVERNMENT MORE EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE, 
supra note 1, at 296 (“In fact, state legislative term limit laws have passed by popularly initiated 
measures in 16 states, while none have been passed by the state legislatures themselves.”). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See David K. Hamilton, Lay Local Government Charter-Writing Commissions, 14 ST. & 
LOC. GOV’T REV. 124, 126 (1982). 
 6. The idea for a constitutional convention as a vehicle for addressing California’s modern 
crisis is relatively new. See, e.g., MATHEWS & PAUL, supra note 1, at 14 (“[T]he Bay Area 
Council, a policy group backed by businesses such as Google. . . .suggested that the state’s 
operating system needed a complete rewrite.”); see Raphael J. Sonenshein, What Charter Reform 
Commissions Can Teach Us About a Proposed Constitutional Convention in California, CAL. J. 
POL. & POL’Y, 2010, at 1, 1; Jim Wunderman, California’s Government Has Failed Us, S.F. 
CHRON. (Aug. 21, 2008), http://articles.sfgate.com/2008-08-21/opinion/17123410_1_ 
constitutional-convention-new-government-california-constitutional-revision-commission 
(proposing that a constitutional convention be called for that purpose). 
 7. See C.L.W., Jr., Note, State Constitutional Change: The Constitutional Convention, 54 
VA. L. REV. 995, 995–1030 (1968) (providing a thorough analysis of the dynamics of a state 
constitutional convention). 
 8. See NEW AM. FOUND., CRUCIAL DETAILS OF A CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION: DELEGATION SELECTION METHODS, SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION, PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION (2009), available at http://www.newamerica.net/files/nafmigration/ 
ConCon_details.pdf. 
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named because the people delegate authority to them.9 Even 
appointed delegates are chosen based on representational criteria 
(e.g., union members, women, young people, and racial and ethnic 
minorities). 10 
Second, a convention has actual authority, because it acts as a 
mechanism to achieve reform and reach decisions. 11 Some decisions 
are implemented directly, such as the national nominating 
convention’s choice of the party’s presidential and vice presidential 
candidates. 12 Other decisions may be implemented indirectly, such as 
the creation of ballot measures or proposals for the legislature. 13 
A convention’s legitimacy derives from its popular roots. 
Because the people select the members, or the members are 
appointed to represent specific segments of the populace, the 
convention’s recommendations should carry great authority. 
A convention is both the most exciting and the riskiest model of 
governmental reform. It hearkens back to the U.S. Constitutional 
Convention of 1787, the Big Bang of governmental reform. 14 If the 
people elect the delegates or if the appointment of delegates is meant 
to ensure representation from a wide variety of constituencies, then 
the people should and likely will feel some connection to the 
convention itself. A convention will generate tremendous media 
coverage. The delegates will consider themselves to be delegates 
 
 9. See id. at 2. 
 10. See id. at 3. 
 11. See Sonenshein, supra note 6, at 1. 
 12. See NEW AM. FOUND., supra note 8, at 8. 
 13. See Sonenshein, supra note 6, at 1. 
 14. See generally CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 52–63 (The Macmillan Company 1921) (discussing how 
economic interests may have found the proposed national government advantageous); 
CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787, at 1–15 (Back Bay Books 1986) 
(describing the origins of the U.S. Constitutional Convention); MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1–42 (1st ed. 1913) (giving background on the 
calling of the U.S. Constitutional Convention and the convention’s members); EDMUND S. 
MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, 1763–89 (3d ed. 1956) (describing how the colonists’ 
immediate needs led to their search for constitutional principles, eventually leading to the 
Revolutionary War); Sonenshein, supra note 6, at 1 (discussing how the appeal of the U.S. 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 may fuel excitement about having a constitutional convention 
in California). 
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more than trustees and may consider themselves to be elected 
officials in their own right. 15 
The flip side of excitement is risk. Elected or appointed 
delegates may well believe that once the convention opens, they are 
free to make their own rules. For example, suppose a state’s voters 
call a convention strictly to address state budget rules. One or more 
delegates might well insist that the state constitution should forbid 
the budget from including abortion funds or require that it guarantee 
a minimum level of income for all state residents. Once created, a 
convention may be hard to rein in. 
Because of the excitement and authority associated with a 
convention, activist groups and politicians would have an urgent 
interest in influencing who becomes a delegate and what the 
delegates decide. They would watch carefully as the convention 
develops, from its design to its selection of delegates to its leadership 
choices to its handling of individual issues. The potential excitement 
and risk of a convention may also account for the intense media 
interest in a convention. 16 After all, who would not want to cover a 
convention that might go anywhere and do anything? 17 Such a 
convention could be easily distinguished from the contemporary 
presidential convention, where the near certainty of the result helps 
account for its declining television coverage. 18 
And yet, despite the excitement, the convention idea has failed 
to take hold in California. In 2009, advocates of a California 
convention halted their plan to gather signatures for a convention 
ballot measure, citing a lack of funding. 19 While the lack of funding 
was the most obvious cause of the convention proposal’s withdrawal, 
there had also been little attention to the many organizational issues 
 
 15. This well-known distinction in political science is between legislators who see 
themselves as delegates sent to carry out the wishes of their constituents and trustees who view 
their role as using their own judgment in the best interests of the community. The latter model is 
associated with Edmund Burke. 
 16. See Sonenshein, supra note 6, at 1; see also The Big Fix, supra note 1, at A34 (providing 
reasons why California needs a constitutional convention to solve its statewide problems). 
 17. It is reasonable to infer that the decreased interest of national media in covering 
presidential nominating conventions is related to the certainty of the outcome and the resulting 
scripting of the event. See Benjamin & Gais, supra note 2, at 62. 
 18. See id. 
 19. Evan Halper & Anthony York, California Reform Bid Called Off, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 
2010, at AA2. 
  
642 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:637 
that would impede the creation of an effective deliberative body 
under the convention model. 20 
Those who blame the convention organizers for the failure of the 
convention model to take hold in California should consider the 
difficulty of the task. California is hardly alone, as the road to 
conventions is often too steep to climb. The imagined benefits are 
distant and open to debate, while the immediate risks are 
overpowering and obvious. Pre-1982, successful conventions were 
limited in their scope to prevent the risk of a runaway convention. 21 
These factors may explain why in recent years conventions have 
failed to get off the ground. Since 1990, no state electorate has 
adopted a proposal to call a constitutional convention; fourteen 
proposals failed at the polls. 22 Gerald Benjamin and Thomas Gais 
have labeled this contemporary decline of state conventions, 
following what was a long history of conventions, 
“conventionphobia.” 23 
The U.S. Constitutional Convention of 1787 is, of course, the 
mother of all reform efforts. This small meeting began with fifty-five 
members and ended with thirty-nine, managed to overturn the 
Articles of Confederation, 24 and created a new constitution that has 
stood the test of time. It has the image of the quintessential 
convention. 25 But repeat performances are unlikely. The 
Constitution’s amendment process is so onerous that few changes 
have been made since 1787. 26 It is difficult to grasp how the 1787 
experience could translate directly to the California of today. 
 
 20. See Sonenshein, supra note 6, at 8 (arguing that better organization of time, staff, and 
agenda will help ensure successful constitutional reform). 
 21. See Kogan, supra note 1, at 3–4; see also Benjamin & Gais, supra note 2, at 53, 54–57 
(discussing “conventionphobia at the national level”). 
 22. Kogan, supra note 1, at 5. 
 23. See Benjamin & Gais, supra note 2, at 69. 
 24. See Sonenshein, supra note 6, at 3. 
 25. See id. at 1. 
 26. See Benjamin & Gais, supra note 2, at 56. 
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II.  SO SHALL WE GIVE UP? 
With the recent collapse of the convention option, California’s 
reformers have fallen into despair. 27 But this hopelessness is 
unfounded. If one tool does not work, pick up another. 
Where should we look for help? A constitutional system that 
grants formal authority only to the national and state governments 
naturally inclines us to look only to these levels for models of 
reform. In so doing, state reformers limit themselves to levels of 
government that have not been particularly successful in designing 
and sharing the best practices of restructuring government. In 
essence, reformers have missed an important source of experience: 
the local level. 
Justice Louis D. Brandeis eloquently described the creative role 
of the states in his dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann: 
There must be power in the States and the Nation to 
remould, through experimentation, our economic practices 
and institutions to meet changing social and economic 
needs. . . . To stay experimentation in things social and 
economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to 
experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to 
the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal 
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country. 28 
This concept of states as “laboratories of democracy” has 
endured as a magnificent justification for states in the federal system. 
But it would be incorrect to consider states to be laboratories of 
reform in which structural innovations for governance are created, 
tested, and disseminated in an ongoing debate about best practices. 
At the state level, reform has been overshadowed by policy 
debates. 29 While there is much more flexibility and much less 
sanctity in state constitutions than in the federal constitution, 30 the 
 
 27. See Halper & York, supra note 19 (“There appears to be no excitement out there for 
these rather complicated reforms. . . . It is hard to go to the public with these ethereal ideas and 
have them understand what you are talking about.”). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. at 70. 
 30. See id. at 62–67. 
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states have not developed structural reform to the same extent as 
America’s local governments. 31 
III.  LOOKING DOWN FOR REFORM 
Meanwhile, percolating below the federal and state levels we 
find a level of government that is literally teeming with structural 
reform efforts, many of which have been successful. America’s real 
laboratories of reform are the local governments that have 
proliferated throughout the nation for more than a century. Local 
government is easily to overlook. Municipal home rule arrived 
relatively late to American government, roughly a century after the 
nation’s founding, 32 and local government is the runt of the 
governmental litter. 
For the first century of American government, localities had 
little scope to design and structure their own governments. 33 They 
were considered to be creatures of state governments, having only as 
much authority as states would grant. 34 “Dillon’s Rule,” a decision 
named after a state court judge in Iowa, asserted that state 
government profoundly limited local governments. 35 Dillon wrote in 
1872: 
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a 
municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the 
following powers, and no others: First those granted in 
express words; second those necessarily or fairly implied in 
or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those 
essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and 
 
 31. Compare id. at 62–63 (“There have been 234 constitutional conventions in American 
states, territories, and the District of Columbia. The states have functioned under 146 separate 
constitutions. In the eight years between 1986 and 1993, 1007 amendments were offered to 
documents currently in force. Of these, 708 passed.”), with Hamilton, supra note 5, at 124 
(“Approximately three-fourths of the states now allow local governments some discretion in 
framing their own charters. This allowance has produced a substantial increase in local 
government charter-writing activity. For example, of the 84 home rule counties that adopted new 
charters through 1980, 56 had been written since 1965 and 39 since 1970.” (citations omitted)). 
 32. See Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial 
Scrutiny, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337, 1340 (2009). 
 33. See id.; Frank J. Goodnow, Municipal Home Rule, 21 POL. SCI. Q. 77, 79–81 (1906). 
 34. See Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 32, at 1340. 
 35. See, e.g., City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455 (1868). 
See generally Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1109–13 
(1980) (discussing the philosophical background of Dillon’s doctrine). 
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purposes of the corporation—not simply convenient, but 
indispensable. 36 
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, state governments 
began to grant home rule authority to local governments. 37 
California, in fact, was one of the first states to grant home rule. 38 
Missouri was first in 1875, 39 followed by California in 1879. 40 The 
vehicle for home rule was the city charter. The voters adopted a 
document that became the community’s governing constitution. 41 
With the adoption of a new city charter, a city became the author 
of its own destiny. Charter cities, in contrast to “general law” cities, 
could select their form of government among many models and had 
greater freedom to contract and to implement other business 
practices. For instance, they could enshrine pension rules beyond the 
reach of the city council and mayor by putting them in the charter. 42 
And, most importantly for this Article, charters themselves could be 
changed through a process of charter reform. 43 Today, roughly a 
quarter of all incorporated cities in California operate as charter 
cities. 44 
In stark contrast to the federal and state levels, reform has 
constantly preoccupied local governments. To some degree, much of 
 
 36. JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448–50 
(5th ed. 1911)  
 37. Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 32, at 1341; David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2387–97 (2003) (stating that Missouri was the first state to grant home 
rule, in 1875; California followed in 1879); Goodnow, supra note 33, at 84. 
 38. See Barron, supra note 37, at 2298. 
 39. Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 32, at 1371 n.160. 
 40. Barron, supra note 37, at 2298. 
 41. See id. at 2295; John C. Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 
1, 5 (1941). 
 42. See Ted Hunt, The Problem with Charter Cities, AM. POLICE BEAT, 
http://www.apbweb.com/news/9-opinion-editorial/1456-the-problem-with-charter-cities.html (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2010). 
 43. See RAPHAEL J. SONENSHEIN, THE CITY AT STAKE: SECESSION, REFORM, AND THE 
BATTLE FOR LOS ANGELES 5 (2004) (“A number of cities have reformed their charters as a 
method to reexamine the effectiveness and responsiveness of governing institutions.”). Over time, 
some of the comparative advantages of charter cities have been eroded as states have given 
greater flexibility to general law cities. For a list of charter cities in California, see Charter Cities 
List, League of Cal. Cities, http://www.cacities.org/index.jsp?zone=locc&previewStory=26279 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2010). 
 44. Facts At A Glance (2010), LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, http://www.cacities.org/ 
index.jsp?zone=locc&previewStory=53 (last updated Nov. 30, 2010) (noting that 120 of 481 
California cities are charter cities). 
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urban politics could be understood as the conflict between political 
machines and bosses on the one hand, and urban reformers on the 
other. 45 Many working class leaders believed that the reformers only 
wished to substitute middle class leaders for themselves, and their 
suspicions were often correct. 46 But urban reform today is such a 
powerful symbol that it is not only the property of “do gooders” and 
middle class “morning glories” but is also contested in city politics 
by a wide variety of interest groups. 47 Some structural reforms, such 
as the adoption of district elections instead of at-large elections, were 
explicitly designed to enhance minority representation. 48 
Urban reform, built on the energy of the Progressive movement, 
generated a massive array of research, institutions, journals, activists, 
and experiences. 49 In 1899, the National Municipal League (now the 
National Civic League) published the first edition of the Model City 
Charter. 50 In 2003, the National Civic League published its eighth 
edition. 51 With the Model City Charter, a new or experienced city 
and its charter commission could examine the city’s charter in light 
of the views of reformers nationwide—views that reflected 
competing schools of thought. 52 Traditionally, most reformers 
emphasized the council-manager system, but in recent years, there 
has been more backing for strong mayors. 53 Other organizations, 
such as the Strong Mayor-Council Institute, challenged reformers’ 
 
 45. See Amy Bridges & Richard Kronick, Writing the Rules to Win the Game: The Middle-
Class Regimes of Municipal Reformers, 34 URB. AFF. REV. 691, 692 (1999). 
 46. See id. at 703. 
 47. See SONENSHEIN, supra note 43, at 6 (“The battle today is really not between the 
reformers and the party regulars. It is between competing visions of urban reform: for example, 
businesslike efficiency weighed against greater representation for minorities.”). 
 48. Compare Susan Welch, The Impact of At-Large Elections on the Representation of 
Blacks and Hispanics, 52 J. POL. 1050, 1050 (1990) (finding that at-large elections represent 
blacks more in 1990 than they did a decade prior, but that district elections still represent blacks 
better than at-large elections; however, district elections do not necessarily create more equal 
representation for Hispanics), with Chandler Davidson & George Korbel, At-Large Elections and 
Minority-Group Representation: A Re-Examination of Historical and Contemporary Evidence, 43 
J. POL. 982, 998 (1981) (observing that current changes from at-large to single-member-district 
elections enhance minority representation in various political subdivisions). 
 49. See SONENSHEIN, supra note 43, at 19. 
 50. NAT’L CIVIC LEAGUE, MODEL CITY CHARTER viii (8th ed. 2003). 
 51. Id. at i. 
 52. See generally id. at vii–xiv (providing background on the origins and growth of the 
Model City Charter and its use by municipalities). 
 53. James H. Svara, Do We Still Need Model Charters? The Meaning and Relevance of 
Reform in the Twenty-First Century, 90 NAT’L CIVIC REV. 19, 20–21 (2001). 
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bias toward the council manager system. 54 The public administration 
literature has addressed comparisons between forms of local 
government, with detailed assessments of the impact of structure on 
spending, economic equality, business development, and 
representation. 55 
Every five years, the International City/County Management 
Association (ICMA) conducts a survey of cities and their municipal 
structures. In the five years preceding the 2001 report, 10 percent of 
all cities reported attempting structural reform. 56 In the five years 
preceding the 2006 report, 8.8 percent of cities reported the same 
activity. 57 Of these attempts, nearly half were successful at the ballot 
box. 58 
Although the percentages may seem low, the absolute numbers 
of successful reforms are fairly impressive. Within the broad 
numbers lies evidence that local government offers an array of 
reform models, both in process and in outcome. 
 
 
 54. See STRONG MAYOR-COUNCIL INST., http://strongmayorcouncil.org/home.html (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
 55. See generally David R. Morgan & John P. Pelissero, Urban Policy: Does Political 
Structure Matter?, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 999, 999–1006 (1980) (describing a study that found 
that reformed cities did not change fiscal behavior). 
 56. INT’L CITY/CNTY. MGMT. ASS’N, MUNICIPAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, 2001, at 2 
(2001) [hereinafter ICMA 2001], available at http://lawschool.westlaw.com/Files/Download/ 
5492974/iCMA.%202002.%20Municipal%20Form%20of%20Government%202001.pdf (listing 
aggregate survey results). 
 57. INT’L CITY/CNTY. MGMT. ASS’N, MUNICIPAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, 2006: TRENDS 
IN STRUCTURE, RESPONSIBILITY, AND COMPOSITION 3 (2006) [hereinafter IMCA 2006], 
available at http://icma.org/Documents/Document/Document/664 (listing aggregate survey 
results). 
 58. Id. 
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Extent of Structural Reforms 59 
 2001 Report 2006 Report 




Surveys sent 7867 8278 
Responses 4244 3864 
Charter cities 54.6 (%) 56.9 
Reform efforts 10.0 (%) 8.8 
Success rates (percentage): 
At large to district 34.8 42.1 
District to at large no data 47.8 
Mixed system 34.3 45.0 
Changed mix 42.9 36.8 
Increase members 58.3 58.6 
Decrease members 50.0 54.5 
Method of election of top elected 39.5 55.9 
Increase powers of top elected 41.7 41.7 
Decrease in powers of top 
elected 
43.8 55.6 




Change appointment of admin. 16.7 0 
Change form of government 45.0 44.9 
IV.  THE CHARTER REFORM COMMISSION 
Charter reform requires an institutional mechanism. A charter 
reform commission, whether appointed or elected, is the preferred 
mechanism. 60 A commission is not required to amend a city charter 
because the city council—or the voters, where state law allows—can 
normally place any revisions on the ballot. But commissions have 
emerged as a popular means to achieve reform. 61 
 
 59. Id.; IMCA 2001. 
 60. See Raphael J. Sonenshein, What Charter Reform Commissions Can Teach Us About a 
Proposed Constitutional Convention in California, CAL. J. POL. & POL’Y, Jan. 2010, at 1, 2. 
 61. See id. 
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In fact, the citizens’ commission has been one of the great 
American innovations. For more than a century, American 
government has benefited from commissions that have weighed 
issues and offered recommendations. 62 Commissions have generated 
credibility outside or alongside the political process. 63 Well-known 
examples include the Kerner Commission that famously concluded 
that America was becoming two nations—one black, one white—
after the 1960s riots; 64 the Christopher Commission that generated 
successful reforms of the Los Angeles Police Department after the 
Rodney King beating; 65 the 9/11 Commission following the 2001 
attacks; 66 and the Knapp Commission on police corruption in New 
York City. 67  
The definition of a commission, like that of a convention, must 
be distilled from experience. By common usage and practice, a 
commission is a body of citizens separate from an elected executive 
or legislature that is tasked with analyzing an issue and proposing 
solutions either to a legislative body, an executive, or the voters. 68 A 
commission may be either elected or appointed. 69 If elected, a charter 
 
 62. See, e.g., id. 
 63. See Serge Grossman & Michael Simon, And Congress Shall Know the Truth: The 
Pressing Need for Restructuring Congressional Oversight of Intelligence, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 435, 436 (2008) (alongside the political process); Steven F. Huefner, Don’t Just Make 
Redistricters More Accountable to the People, Make Them the People, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 37, 40–42 (2010) (outside the political process); Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Grassroots 
Consensus Building and Collaborative Planning, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 709, 719–20 (2000) 
(outside the political process). 
 64. Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 90 
B.U. L. REV. 255, 302 (2010). 
 65. See id. 
 66. Bennie G. Thompson, A Legislative Prescription for Confronting 21st-Century Risks to 
the Homeland, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 277, 281–82 (2010). 
 67. Steven B. Duke, Mass Imprisonment, Crime Rates, and the Drug War: A Penological 
and Humanitarian Disgrace, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 17, 27 (2009). 
 68. See Salsich, Jr., supra note 63, at 712 (“[Neighborhood collaborative planning] can, 
though, be a useful technique for giving residents a feeling that they have a stake in the outcome 
of decisions that may be made about their community, as well as a way to participate in the 
decision-making process.”); see Huefner, supra note 63, at 40–42 (describing a 2005 redistricting 
commission in California); see also NAT’L CIVIC LEAGUE, GUIDE FOR CHARTER COMMISSIONS 6 
(5th ed. 1991) (“The charter commission, a distinctly American contribution to the art and 
practice of local government . . . has a unique and important service to perform. Like a 
constitutional convention at the state or national level, it investigates the existing government and 
charter . . . . Free from the necessity of engaging in actual government and party strife, it can turn 
its full attention to the improvement of governmental machinery.”). 
 69. See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 124. 
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reform commission bears some resemblance to a convention. Indeed, 
elected charter reform commissioners behave quite differently from 
appointed ones. 70 In some states, like Michigan, elected commissions 
predominate. 71 Appointed commissions are more likely to be 
described as “blue ribbon” panels. 72 
The nation’s two largest cities, New York City and Los Angeles, 
completed major charter reforms in recent decades. 73 In the late 
1980s, New York City faced a governance crisis because a federal 
court ruled the Board of Estimate was in violation of one person, one 
vote. 74 The city established two successive charter reform 
commissions that recommended major changes to the city’s 
governance; these recommendations were adopted by the voters.. 75 
The commissions successfully navigated New York City’s intense 
and complex politics. 76 The authors of the changes prepared several 
publications that both provided details about the mechanics and 
politics of reform as well as some advice to other charter 
commissions. 77  
In California, major charter reforms were completed in recent 
decades in San Francisco, San Jose, Oakland, and San Diego. 78 In 
 
 70. Id. at 125–26. 
 71. See Susan B. Hannah, Writing Home-Rule Charters in Michigan: Current Practices in 
Constitution Making, 84 NAT’L CIVIC REV. 140, 141–42 (1995). 
 72. Hamilton, supra note 5, at 126. 
 73. Raphael J. Sonenshein, Gotham on Our Minds: New York City in the Los Angeles 
Charter Reform of 1996–1999, in NEW YORK & LOS ANGELES: POLITICS, SOCIETY, AND 
CULTURE 301 (David Halle ed., 2003) 
 74. See Frank J. Mauro & Gerald Benjamin, The Reemergence of Municipal Reform, in 
RESTRUCTURING THE NEW YORK CITY GOVERNMENT: THE REEMERGENCE OF MUNICIPAL 
REFORM 1, 3 (Frank J. Mauro & Gerald Benjamin eds., 1989); Joseph P. Viteritti, The Tradition 
of Municipal Reform: Charter Revision in Historical Context, in RESTRUCTURING THE NEW 
YORK CITY GOVERNMENT: THE REEMERGENCE OF MUNICIPAL REFORM, supra, at 16, 29; 
Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr. & Eric Lane, The Policy and Politics of Charter Making: The Story 
of New York City’s 1989 Charter, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 729, 731–32 (1998). 
 75. See Mauro & Benjamin, supra note 74, at 5–7. 
 76. See id. at 6–7. 
 77. See generally id. (focusing on the most significant and controversial issues that 
confronted the Schwarz Charter Revision Commission and the Ravitch Commission that 
preceded it). 
 78. In 1998, Oakland voters approved a charter change to increase the authority of the 
mayor. Brown v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 606, 608 (Ct. App. 2000). 
An attempt by the mayor of Sacramento to increase mayoral authority failed to win council 
approval to go the ballot in 2010. Ryan Lillis, Kevin Johnson Won’t Raise Strong-Mayor Issue 
Until Next Year or 2012, SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 13, 2010), http://blogs.sacbee.com/ 
capitolalertlatest/2010/04/kevin-johnson-wont-raise-stron.html. Voters in San Diego replaced 
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Los Angeles, pressure from the San Fernando Valley for secession 
from the city led to the creation of two competing charter reform 
commissions, one elected and one appointed. 79 After two years of 
competition, they agreed on a single charter, persuaded the city 
council to place it on the ballot, and received voter endorsement in 
1999. 80 
At any given time, an Internet search turns up functioning 
charter reform commissions in cities of all sizes around the country. 
The commissions borrow from each other, conduct meetings and 
hearings in their own communities, and develop recommendations. 
Some succeed and some fail. 81 The charter reform commission is a 
core element of a culture of reform at the local level. 
To get an idea of how much more widespread charter reform 
commissions have been than state constitutional conventions since 
1990, consider my own experience: since 1997, I have been the 
principal staff person for appointed charter reform commissions in 
Los Angeles, Glendale, Burbank, Culver City, and Huntington 
Beach, all within a relatively narrow corridor of Los Angeles and 
Orange Counties. During that same period of time, voters have not 
approved a single state constitutional convention. . And of course my 
own experience represents only a tiny sliver of the wide range of 
local charter commissions to be found in cities throughout the nation 
during the same period. 
Commissions are so ingrained in the charter reform process that 
books have been written to guide commissioners in their duties. 82 
The sharing of experience is a common feature in local charter 
reform. When I took my position in Los Angeles, I contacted Eric 
Lane, who had been the executive director of the New York City 
charter reform ten years earlier. The final report and the official 
 
their Council-Manager system with a Mayor-Council plan on an experimental basis in 2006, and 
then on a permanent basis in 2010. Proposition D: Strong Mayor Form of Governance City of 
San Diego, SMART VOTER, http://www.smartvoter.org/2010/06/08/ca/sd/prop/D/ (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2010). 
 79. SONENSHEIN, supra note 43, at xiii, xvi. 
 80. Id. at 104, 181–83, 191. 
 81. NAT’L CIVIC LEAGUE, supra note 68. 
 82. See, e.g., id.; Adam W. Herbert, The Los Angeles Charter: Lessons of Defeat, 60 NAT’L 
CIVIC REV. 603 (1971) (providing a political study of the failed charter process). A range of other 
less well-known guides are cited in James M. Harkin, Structural Change and Municipal 
Government: The Syracuse Case, 15 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 3 (1983). 
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records of a previous (failed) charter reform commission in Los 
Angeles were available for our guidance. 83 
Generally, charter commissions hire their own staffs and also 
draw on city staff, conduct wide-ranging surveys of comparative best 
practices, hear testimony and debate, and conduct a thorough review 
of the charter itself. 84 Many times, local observers underestimate 
such commissions because of their rather quiet beginnings. If it can 
reach a consensus, however, the commission tends to get much more 
positive support for its recommendations by the end than might be 
envisioned at the start. A commission’s odds of success are greatly 
enhanced if its leadership is attuned to the political viability of its 
proposals. 85 
The basic value of a commission model for the California 
governance crisis is that it reduces the initial risk of undertaking 
reform, while offering the possibility of well-designed reforms that 
may build credibility among elites and with the voters. This model is 
the converse of the constitutional convention, which stacks its risks 
up front. 86 Furthermore, initiating a commission is much easier than 
creating a convention. A commission can be established by a 
majority vote of the legislature, by the governor, or ideally by both 
working together. By contrast, the creation of a constitutional 
convention requires action from the voters. 87 The commission model 
provides the possibility of developing a long-term culture of 
reform—not by promising a magic bullet solution, but by becoming 
a credible clearinghouse and evaluator of all possible proposals over 
a considerable period of time. 
 
 83. L.A. CITY CHARTER COMM’N, CITY GOVERNMENT FOR THE FUTURE (1969). Our staff 
located the files of this commission in a long-neglected filing cabinet at city hall. 
 84. See NAT’L CIVIC LEAGUE, supra note 68, at 11–12. 
 85. See Eric Lane, The Practical Lessons of Charter Reform, in RESTRUCTURING THE NEW 
YORK CITY GOVERNMENT: THE REEMERGENCE OF MUNICIPAL REFORM, supra note 74, at 31–
34. 
 86. See Joseph Grodin, Popular Sovereignty and Its Limits: Lessons for a Constitutional 
Convention in California, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 623 (2011); Ann Lousin, How to Hold a State 
Constitutional Convention in the Twenty-First Century, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 603 (2011); Steven 
Miller, Getting to a Citizens’ Constitutional Convention: Legal Questions (Without Answers) 
Concerning the People’s Ability to Reform California’s Government Through a Constitutional 
Convention, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 545 (2011).   
 87. At the local level, it is somewhat easier to establish an appointed commission than an 
elected one, which may require a vote of the people to create it. See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2; 
Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Malleable Constitutions: Reflections on State Constitutional 
Reform, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1517, 1522–23 (2009). 
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States have made some use of constitutional reform 
commissions. 88 Kelley Armitage describes the commission’s role in 
state constitutional reform as “of relatively recent vintage.” 89It is not 
uncommon for commissions to do the quiet preparatory work for a 
more public convention. 90 In the state of Maryland, a commission set 
the table magnificently for the convention, whose final 
recommendations the voters nonetheless defeated. 91 I believe that 
using commission to set up conventions is backward and that the 
commission ought to be front and center rather than a handmaiden to 
an unpredictable convention. I propose that California lead with a 
commission that may ultimately create the conditions for a 
convention. That convention would be more of a mechanism for 
evaluating commission proposals than a fundamental decision-
maker. In that sense, this convention would more closely 
approximate the original convention model of 1787. 
The 1787 U.S. Constitutional Convention created the reputation 
of the convention model itself. In our national hagiography, 
delegates were sent to Philadelphia, and wisely produced the world’s 
most enduring written constitution. 92 However, that constitutional 
convention was more like a commission than a convention. For 
example, the meeting was not really a decision-making forum, but a 
prelude to formal ratification by the states. Conscious of their limited 
popular legitimacy and given their stated assignment of “revising” 
the Articles of Confederation, the members invented a new 
ratification process that was built around real conventions, elected by 
the people in each state. 93 And in today’s terms, the members of the 
1787 constitutional convention were more like distinguished 
commissioners (trustees) than delegates. They included the cream of 
 
 88. See Benjamin & Gais, supra note 2, at 74–75; Cain & Noll, supra note 87, at 1522–23. 
 89. Kelley H. Armitage, Government Lawyer: Constitution Revision Commissions Avoid 
Logrolling, Don’t They?, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1998, at 62; Benjamin & Gais, supra note 2, at 74–75. 
 90. Kogan, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
 91. Id. at 2. 
 92. Thomas Jefferson, who was unable to attend the convention because of his diplomatic 
service in Paris, referred to its members as “an assembly of demigods.” NATHAN SCHACHNER, 
THOMAS JEFFERSON: A BIOGRAPHY 342 (1st ed. 1957). 
 93. See U.S. CONST. art. VII (“The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be 
sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.”). 
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the crop of the nation’s leadership. 94 If ever there was a blue ribbon 
commission, this was it. 
V.  MODELS THAT MIGHT WORK 
Two states, Florida and Utah, have established constitutional 
revision commissions that might provide models for California. The 
Florida Constitution requires the convening of a constitutional 
commission every twenty years. 95 Remarkably, the commission has 
the power to place amendments directly on the state ballot. 96 
The Florida commission consists of the attorney general serving 
ex officio and thirty-six additional members, appointed as follows: 
fifteen (including the chair of the commission) by the governor; nine 
by each of the president of the senate and the speaker of the house of 
representatives; and three by the chief justice of the Florida Supreme 
Court. 97 The most recent commission served from 1997–1998. 
Utah follows a different process. A state constitutional revision 
commission was created by law (not by the Utah Constitution) in 
1969. 98 In 1977, the commission became a permanent government 
feature. 99 The commission consists of the director of the Office of 
Legislative Research and General Counsel ex officio and fifteen 
additional members, appointed as follows: three appointed by the 
speaker of the house from the house, not more than two from the 
same political party; three appointed by the president of the senate 
from the senate, not more than two from the same political party; 
three appointed by the governor, not more than two from the same 
political party; and the six remaining members selected by the 
previously listed members, with consideration given to geographical 
and bipartisan representation. 100  
 
 94. The delegates included James Madison, Benjamin Franklin, and Alexander Hamilton. 
The members chose George Washington, the leading figure of the nation, as the convention’s 
presiding officer. 
 95. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Archive Report of Utah Constitutional Revision Commission, UTAH DEP’T OF ADMIN. 
SERVS., http://archives.state.ut.us/cgi-bin//cathtmljava2.cgi?RUN-WHAT=CATHTML& 
TEMPLATE=AGENCY&AGENCY=240 (last visited Oct. 31, 2010). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
  
Winter 2011] CITIZENS’ COMMISSION 655 
If California were to follow either of these models, the 
appointment process would not have to be so dependent on 
government officials. Positions could be reserved for members of 
credible organizations, such as the League of Women Voters, and 
even ordinary citizens. 101 The governor and legislature could start the 
process by enacting a law establishing a state constitutional revision 
commission. The state could decide at a later time, as did Utah, to 
make it permanent. Based on the charter reform experience, it would 
be wise to appoint a mixture of well-known, experienced people and 
“amateurs” who more closely approximate average Californians. 
The value of the commission model is that it reduces the conflict 
over reform by removing the process from the elected leadership and 
putting a group of citizens in charge. While it may be boring at first, 
the commission model allows a formal reform process to begin 
without activating a hornet’s nest of opposition. It is, in this sense, 
the opposite of the convention model, which is high on excitement 
and risk at the outset. There is one type of charter reform 
commission that exists in a gray area between commission and 
convention—the elected charter reform commission. Under 
California state law, the voters may create a charter reform 
commission by initiative and elect its members. Then, the 
commission’s recommendations go directly to the voters without 
passing through the city council. 102 In this respect, an elected 
commission is similar to the Florida constitutional commission. In 
any case, an elected commission is still likely to be much smaller and 
its members better able to deliberate than those of the very large 
body that convention advocates favor. 
In 1997, the city of Los Angeles undertook an extraordinary 
charter reform process that reflected intense conflict between the city 
council and Mayor Richard Riordan. 103 The mayor and council 
nearly agreed to create a real hybrid commission: an appointed 
charter reform commission that could take its recommendations 
 
 101. The League of Women Voters mission statement is as follows: “The League of Women 
Voters, a nonpartisan political organization, encourages informed and active participation in 
government, works to increase understanding of major public policy issues, and influences public 
policy through education and advocacy.” About the League, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, 
http://www.lwv.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=About_Us (last visited Nov. 20, 2010). 
 102. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 34450–34462 (West 2008). 
 103. See SONENSHEIN, supra note 43, at 85–86. 
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directly to the ballot without legislative review. But the deal fell 
through, and the mayor withdrew his support. 104 Without the mayor’s 
participation, the council created an appointed commission of 
twenty-one distinguished and also less well-known citizens. 105 The 
mayor then utilized state law to create and finance a ballot initiative 
for an elected charter reform commission whose recommendations 
would go directly to the ballot. Thus, by 1997, the city had two 
competing city charter reform commissions—one appointed and the 
other elected—a circumstance possibly without precedent in urban 
government. 106 
For two years the commissions competed like siblings. And yet, 
the Los Angeles charter reform succeeded, in part because of the 
interplay between the two models. The appointed commission 
provided the intellectual foundation and legitimacy for charter 
reform, winning support from key elites and local media for its 
process. 107 The elected commission brought popular sovereignty to 
the table, including the ability to go around the city council if 
necessary. When the two commissions negotiated a unified charter, 
the council and mayor were powerless to keep it off the ballot, and it 
received over 60 percent of the vote in 1999. 108 Thus, for California, 
a composite process of a citizens’ commission followed by a 
convention that could examine and ratify its recommendations might 
bring the best of both models to the table. 109 
In addition to maintaining reform momentum, the commission 
model might help with another problem in California’s 
government—the lack of expert review of initiatives. There has been 
discussion about California’s lack of an indirect initiative and the 
impact this absence has had on the quality of ballot measures. 110 The 
state legislature’s unpopularity weakens the argument for a 
legislative review of ballot measures. An alternative might be to have 
 
 104. Id. at 85. 
 105. See id. at 86–87. 
 106. Id. at 103. 
 107. See id. at 89. 
 108. Id. at 191. 
 109. A nongovernmental model of this combination may emerge if Repair California, an 
organization that favors a convention, and California Forward, an organization that plans to bring 
recommendations to the state legislature, were to join forces. 
 110. See CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING 
CALIFORNIA’S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 16–17 (2d ed. 2008). 
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a neutral, credible citizens’ commission play the role of review 
body. 111 If such a commission were to become a central focus of a 
new culture of reform in California, the voters might welcome 
having a review body to improve the initiatives on which they vote. 
With considerable advance planning, a strategy for a reform 
commission can be developed to avoid previous pitfalls and enjoy 
the best chance of success.  
An argument against a constitutional commission for California 
is that California has already tried constitutional reform by 
commission—and failed—in the early 1990s. In 1994, the state 
legislature created a blue ribbon commission, but when its work was 
completed, the legislature largely ignored its recommendations. 112 
Successful reform requires a combination of good timing, strong 
organization, and political acumen. With considerable advance 
planning, a strategy for a reform commission can be developed to 
avoid previous pitfalls and enjoy the best chance of success. 
Any local charter reformer would see a failed attempt at reform 
as a source of lessons for future success rather than as an argument 
against another attempt at reform. The odds are always against 
reform, but a well-designed mechanism to reduce risk at the outset so 
that long-term reform may be possible is well worth the effort. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
While there is widespread agreement that there is a crisis of 
governance in California, there is little consensus as to which 
institutional structure would best facilitate useful reform. Although 
the idea of a constitutional convention captured the imagination of 
the reform community, it failed to generate enough financial and 
political support to be implemented. The citizens’ commission, 
another model of reform, has been largely ignored. Yet hundreds of 
cities successfully used the commission model over the past century 
to accomplish reform. Some state constitutional reforms outside 
California have successfully used such commissions. The 
 
 111. See Bruce E. Cain, Introduction: To Con-Con or Not: California’s Constitutional 
Decision, 2 CAL. J. POL. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2010). 
 112. See Cain & Noll, supra note 1, at 1; see also Sonenshein, supra note 6, at 7 
(“California[’s] . . . constitutional revision commission[’s] . . . recommendations never made the 
ballot and failed to even get out of the legislature. But the commission left a valuable report that 
would guide future commissions.”). 
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commission model of governmental reform is much less exciting 
than a constitutional convention, but for that very reason it reduces 
the initial risk of undertaking such an effort—a risk that is likely to 
prove fatal to reform. The low profile of citizens’ commissions 
allows a thorough airing of issues and the development of the sort of 
credibility that may give its recommendations surprising force. 
California should look to Florida and Utah, states in which 
permanent constitutional reform commissions have legal standing, as 
models of how California might steadily and effectively work toward 
a solution in a manner that both reduces the immediate political risk 
to all affected interests and leaves open the chance for long-term 
reform.  
